“Undoubtedly, many aspects of Title VII litigation changed in the forty-four years between Pettway and Nassar, but Pettway was not premised on the lack of but-for causation, later required by Nassar.”

Finding its 1969 precedent was not abrogated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Nassar, the Eleventh Circuit held that a district court did not err in relying on that precedent to instruct a jury—in the trial of a deputy who alleged he was fired because of his EEOC charge—that an employer may not terminate an employee because of anything written in their EEOC charge regardless of whether the employer believes the charge is false. Nor did the district court err in denying the sheriff’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law based on insufficient evidence of causation, said the court, finding the evidence sufficient to create a jury question as to whether the deputy’s charge was the but-for cause of his termination (Ellis v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, No. 25-13267 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2026)).

EEOC charge. The plaintiff was hired by the sheriff’s office in 2007 as a community service officer, a civilian position, and promoted in 2010 to detention deputy. In 2021, he filed an EEOC charge alleging the sheriff’s office discriminated and retaliated against him because of his disability and religion and because of his need for reasonable accommodations. The charge further stated that he had “never had any issues at work until [he] received word that...

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