Where a defendant employer has moved for summary judgment on a plaintiff’s claim of pregnancy discrimination, that motion should be denied because a reasonable juror could find that the reason given for the plaintiff’s termination was a pretext.
“Plaintiff Christin Ronzio brings a pregnancy discrimination suit against Defendant Williams Lea, Inc. (‘Williams Lea’) for terminating her employment on the basis of her pregnancy in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 151B, §4. …
“Plaintiff has produced evidence to support her prima facie case: she was pregnant, performed her job at an acceptable level, and her employment was terminated while male peers were retained. In turn, Defendant provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. It states it needed to eliminate her position to reduce costs due to financial challenges exacerbated by COVID-19. A reasonable juror could find that the reason given for her termination was a pretext based on three factors.
“First is the temporal proximity of Plaintiff’s pregnancy disclosure and her termination. … Plaintiff notified Defendant of her pregnancy on March 26, 2020 and was terminated on April 24, 2020. Although Defendant insists the decisionmaker, Ms. Denise Reid, learned of Plaintiff’s pregnancy after the decision to terminate was already made, the timing is a fact question.
“Second, Defendant’s alleged timeline for decision-making has shifted during the litigation. In its answer to Plaintiff’s...
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