Last week and this, I've been serializing my Large Libel Models? Liability for AI Output draft. For some earlier posts on this (including § 230, disclaimers, publication, and more), see here; one particular significant point is at Communications Can Be Defamatory Even If Readers Realize There's a Considerable Risk of Error. Today, I close with some thoughts on how my analysis, which has focused on libel, might be generalizable to other torts.
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[A.] False Light
Generally speaking, false light tort claims should likely be treated the same way as defamation claims. To be sure, the distinctive feature of the false light tort is that it provides for a remedy when false statements about a person are not defamatory, but are merely distressing to that person (in a way the reasonable person test would recognize). Perhaps that sort of harm can't justify a chilling effect on AI companies, even if harm to reputation can. Indeed, this may be part of the reason why not all states recognize the false light tort.
Nonetheless, if platforms are already required to deal with false material—especially outright spurious quotes—through a notice-and-blocking procedure, or through a mandatory quote-checking mechanism, then adapting this to false light claims should likely produce little extra chilling effect on AIs' valuable design features.
[B.] Disclosure of Private Facts
An LLM is unlikely to produce information that constitutes tortious disclosure of private facts. Private information...
ALOR GAJAH: An army major claimed trial at the Ayer Kerod Sessions Court here today to five charges of submitting false claims involving maintenance work and non-existent raw material supplies wor...